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Abstract 
 Macroeconomic imbalances increase the probability of economic 
crisis, even more so in a monetary union with limited economic policy tools 
available. In the Economic and Monetary Union (EMU, euro area or 
eurozone), macroeconomic imbalances have accumulated since the euro 
introduction and they have significantly contributed to the emergence of the 
recent crisis with serious impacts on several Member States and hereby on 
the whole euro area. In order to improve the proper functioning of the EMU 
and prevent possible future crisis, a governance reform has been undertaken 
in the European Union (EU) in 2011, including introduction of a new 
procedure for preventing and correcting macroeconomic imbalances - the 
Macroeconomic Imbalance Procedure (MIP). It starts with an alert 
mechanism based on a set of eleven macroeconomic indicators with their 
threshold values (the so-called scoreboard), which this paper mainly focuses 
on. The first part of the paper provides an overview on the functioning of the 
preventive and corrective arm of the new procedure within the EU. The 
second part deals with the economic reasons for establishing respective MIP 
indicators. Finally, the third part aims to test appropriateness of the 
composition of the scoreboard for anticipation of the recent crisis by 
analysing the development of the indicators in the twelve euro area countries 
in period 2004-2007, i.e. prior to the outbreak of the crisis. 
 
Keywords: Euro area, Macroeconomic Imbalance Procedure, scoreboard of 
indicators, crisis 
 
Introduction 
 In a monetary union such as the EMU, the Member States abandon 
their autonomous monetary policy as well as exchange rate policy tools. 
Hence, in the event that asymmetric shocks occur, the Member States have to 
use their fiscal policy tools and/or flexible labour markets (i.e. labour 
mobility or wage flexibility) for adjustments after shocks. However, within 
the euro area labour mobility is rather limited and wage flexibility is not 
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particularly high. In a period of difficult economic developments, room for 
fiscal policy measures is also limited. Another possible solution to face 
asymmetric shocks would be fiscal transfers, which, although discussed at 
the European level, are politically not feasible at present. In such conditions, 
it is very important to prevent occurrence of asymmetric shocks in the EMU 
by early identifying macroeconomic imbalances that could lead to these 
shocks and by adopting necessary measures in respective economies to 
reduce or eliminate the existing imbalances (Essl and Stiglbauer, 2012). This 
has become even more important after the outbreak of the current economic 
and financial crisis, followed by the debt crisis in the euro area.  
 The heterogeneity of the economies participating in the eurozone has 
made the area as a whole vulnerable to external shocks such as the recent 
crisis which revealed weaknesses in the governance framework underlying 
the functioning of the EMU. So in order to prevent possible future crisis, a 
governance reform has been undertaken in the European Union (EU), 
including introduction of a new procedure within the EU's annual cycle of 
economic policy guidance and surveillance (the European Semester) for 
preventing and correcting macroeconomic imbalances in the euro area - the 
Macroeconomic Imbalance Procedure (MIP). It is a surveillance mechanism 
that aims to identify potential risks early on, correct the imbalances that are 
already in place and prevent them from re-emerging. The MIP represents an 
integral part of economic policy coordination within the EU and in particular 
within the EMU, where the need for such policy coordination is even 
stronger. 
 In September 2010, the European Commission (subsequently referred 
to as "Commission") adopted a legislative package consisting of six 
proposals, the so called six-pack legislation, which aims to reinforce the 
monitoring and surveillance of fiscal, macroeconomic and structural reform 
policies in the EU and the euro area compared to previously applied 
legislation. The Ecofin Council and European Council reached an agreement 
on the six-pack legislation to improve EU economic governance in March 
2011. As a result of discussion on economic indicators to detect 
macroeconomic imbalances, Ecofin/Eurogroup adopted resolution on the 
design of the scoreboard of indicators in November 2011. The legislation on 
the MIP entered into force in December that year, so it could became a part 
of the 2012 European semester. The MIP legislation consists of two 
regulations included in the six-pack: Regulation (EU) No 1176/2011 of the 
European Parliament and of the Council of 16 November 2011 on the 
prevention and correction of macroeconomic imbalances and Regulation 
(EU) No 1174/2011 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 16 
November 2011 on enforcement measures to correct excessive 
macroeconomic imbalances in the euro area. Regulation 1176/2011 covers 
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all EU Member States and lays out the details of the surveillance procedure, 
while Regulation 1174/2011 applies only to euro area Member States and 
focuses on enforcement, including the possibility of sanctions. 
 
Preventive and Corrective arm of the MIP 
 As the Stability and Growth Pact (SGP)33, also the MIP consists of 
the preventive and corrective arm. Within the preventive arm of the 
procedure potential macroeconomic problems have to be identified and 
regularly analysed in order to detect the emergence of imbalances early-on. 
The corrective arm will come into effect if macroeconomic imbalances in a 
particular Member State prove to be serious, i.e. “excessive”.34 
Consequently, this Member State will be required to submit a plan for 
corrective measures. The corrective arm provides means to effectively 
enforce correction of imbalances. In case the Member State concerned fails 
to comply with the recommended corrective actions, sanction may be 
imposed.  
 The MIP is built as a “two-step approach”. The first step is 
represented by an alert mechanism which works as a filter. The objective of 
the alert mechanism is to focus attention on observed risks early on and 
identify the Member States for which, in the second step, more in-depth 
analysis appears warranted so as to assess their vulnerability and substantiate 
policy recommendations if appropriate (European Commission, 2012b). So it 
is in-depth analysis, and not the alert mechanism, which provides the basis 
for any recommendations to be addressed to the Member State under the 
preventive or corrective arm of the MIP.  
 The MIP starts with the Alert Mechanism Report (AMR), prepared 
by the Commission in November each year since 2012. The alert mechanism 
is based on the so-called scoreboard, i.e. a set of eleven (previously ten) 
macroeconomic indicators of external imbalances, competiveness and 
internal imbalances with their threshold values established by the 
Commission. The threshold values are not interpreted mechanically, but in 
conjunction with the accompanying qualitative analysis. This approach gives 
the Commission both flexibility and a high degree of discretion in 
                                                          
33 SGP is a set of rules designed to ensure that countries in the EU pursue sound public 
finances and coordinate their fiscal policies. 
34 According to the Regulation 1176/2011, a macroeconomic imbalance means “any trend 
giving rise to macroeconomic developments which are adversely affecting, or have the 
potential adversely to affect, the proper functioning of the economy of a Member State or of 
the Economic and Monetary Union, or of the Union as a whole”, while the excessive 
imbalances are defined as “severe imbalances, including imbalances that jeopardise or risks 
jeopardising the proper functioning of the economic and monetary union”. 
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interpreting the data (Moschella, 2014). The overall number of breaches of 
thresholds, the severity of individual breaches as well as the combination of 
breaches, potentially signalling broad based problems, is also taken into 
account (European Commission, 2011).  
 Based on the results of the scoreboard and the qualitative analysis, as 
well as taking into account relevant data beyond the scope of the scoreboard 
(additional indicators) in order to get a more complete picture, the 
Commission identifies the Member States that face risk of excessive 
imbalances. In these countries a closer analysis (in-depth review) is being 
carried out by the Commission in collaboration with the affected Member 
State. The in-depth review focuses on causes and potential effects of existing 
macroeconomic imbalances.  
 Following the in-debt reviews the Commission determines whether 
imbalances exist and what their nature is. Depending on the severity of the 
imbalances the Commission proposes policy recommendation either under 
the preventive or under the corrective arm of the MIP.  Strictly speaking, the 
in-depth review can lead to three different results: 1. the Commission does 
not detect any macroeconomic imbalances and consequently does not take 
any further steps; 2. the Commission detects macroeconomic imbalances and 
advises the Council of the EU (the Council) to issue recommendations for 
preventive action to the affected Member State or 3. the Commission detects 
excessive imbalances which could jeopardize the functioning of monetary 
union and advises the Council to issue recommendations for corrective 
action to the affected Member State.  
 The Excessive Imbalance Procedure (EIP) would be initiated only in 
cases where the in-depth review leads to the third conclusion above. This 
would mean starting the corrective arm of the MIP, potentially leading to 
sanctions for euro area Member States. If the in-depth review leads to the 
second point above, the European Council issues recommendations on the 
correction of the macroeconomic imbalances to the Member State. These 
recommendations are only of preventive nature and represent a part of the 
proposals for country-specific recommendations, which provide guidance for 
national policy making. 
 After starting an EIP under the corrective arm of the MIP, the 
Member State concerned must submit a corrective action plan (CAP), based 
on a Council recommendation. The plan must contain adequate measures for 
the correction of the imbalances detected and specify the implementation 
timetable. In case the plan is considered inadequate, the Council will issue 
another recommendation, based on a proposal from the Commission. Then 
the Member State must submit a new CAP. On the other hand, if the plan is 
considered adequate, the Member State will be asked to implement the 
corrective actions defined in the plan within the timetable. If a Member State 
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fails to implement the defined corrective measures adequately, the Council 
will issue a recommendation setting new deadlines for implementation.  
 The enforcement of the EIP is backed by sanctions. In the event of 
contraventions financial sanctions may be imposed for the euro area Member 
States (but not for the other EU Member States). In case of an inadequate 
implementation of a CAP, an interest-bearing deposit equal to 0.1% of the 
country’s GDP will be imposed. Moreover, two consecutive negative 
evaluations with regard to the CAP or the implementation of corrective 
measures will entail an annual fine equal to 0.1% of the country’s GDP. This 
fine will be applied until the CAP has been accepted or the implementation 
of the corrective measures considered being adequate. If an interest-bearing 
deposit with the Commission has already been imposed on the Member 
State, the deposit will be transformed into an annual fine. The penalties will 
be used for the financing of the European Stability Mechanism (ESM). The 
EIP will be terminated once the Council, based on a recommendation from 
the Commission, determines that the imbalances have been effectively 
eliminated. 
 One of the major innovations of the procedure is the use of a reverse 
qualified majority voting (RQMV), under which a Council decision on a 
Commission recommendation regarding the activation of sanctions against 
euro area Member States is deemed to be adopted by the Council unless it 
decides, by qualified majority, to reject the recommendation within ten days. 
Thus, RQMV enhances the likelihood that the surveillance process will 
proceed as planned rather than being blocked by political considerations 
(Moschella, 2014). 
 
Indicators of the scoreboard 
 In November 2011 the Commission published a Staff Working Paper 
presenting envisaged initial design of the scoreboard of early-warning 
indicators for the surveillance of macroeconomic imbalances (European 
Commission, 2011). The proposal contained ten indicators and considered an 
additional indicator on the banking/financial sector that would be developed 
by the end of 2012. The design of the scoreboard is based on a set of four 
principles: 1. The choice of indicators focuses on the most relevant 
dimensions of macroeconomic imbalances and competitiveness losses, with 
a particular emphasis on the smooth functioning of the euro area. 2. The 
scoreboard indicators and thresholds should provide a reliable signalling 
device for potentially harmful imbalances and competitiveness losses at an 
early stage of their emergence (thresholds established with a statistical 
approach based on the distributions of the indicators' values identifying the 
thresholds as the lower and/or upper quartiles of the distributions; such 
thresholds are consistent with the values found in some empirical studies in 
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the available economic literature). 3. The scoreboard has an important 
communication role. 4. Indicators are of high statistical quality in terms of 
timeliness and comparability across countries. 
 Nowadays the scoreboard used for AMRs consists of eleven 
indicators (including indicator on the financial sector) with their indicative 
thresholds. The indicators include both stock and flow indicators which can 
capture shorter-term deteriorations as well as the longer-term accumulation 
of imbalances. The economic rationale behind the inclusion of individual 
indicators into the scoreboard, the transformations used and the 
determination of threshold values is in short as follows (European 
Commission, 2012b): 
 
Current account balance 
 3 year backward moving average of the current account balance as 
percentage of GDP, with indicative thresholds of +6% and -4% 
 The current account balance is one of the most significant indicators 
in explaining crisis incidence. The economy with a high current account 
deficit is borrowing and importing in excess of its exports. Surveillance 
under the MIP covers also current account surpluses; however, a greater 
degree of urgency is required in economies with large current account 
deficits and competitiveness losses. Hence the need for policy action is 
strong in economies with large deficits of the current account; however, also 
the Member States with large current account surpluses should implement 
the reforms focusing on strengthening their domestic demand. The average 
over three years is used in calculation in order to provide indications of the 
persistence of a potential imbalance. The indicative threshold for current 
account deficits of -4% was derived from the historical data for the EU 
Member States, using a simple statistical distribution analysis. The upper 
value of the threshold is set at +6%.35 
 
Net international investment position (NIIP) 
 NIIP as percentage of GDP, with an indicative threshold of -35% 
 The NIIP as the net financial position (assets minus liabilities) of the 
domestic sectors of the economy versus the rest of the world is the stock 
counterpart to the current account balance. Persistently high current account 
deficit leads to highly negative NIIP. Calculation as a share of GDP allows 
for cross-country comparability. Value for the last available year is used and 
the indicative threshold is -35% of GDP. However, besides the level also 
                                                          
35 The initial scoreboard used by the Commission had the same 4% trigger point for the 
current account imbalance, whether this was a surplus or a deficit. However, this was later 
changed into an asymmetric trigger: +6% for surplus countries and 4% for deficit countries 
(De Grauwe, 2012). 
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composition of assets and liabilities in terms of maturities is an important 
factor when assessing the overall vulnerability of the external position of a 
Member State.  
Real effective exchange rates (REER) 
 3 years percentage change of the REER based on HICP/CPI 
deflators, relative to 41 other industrial countries, with indicative thresholds 
of -/+5% for euro area countries and -/+11% for non-euro area countries 
 The indicator of the REER is based on consumer prices in order to 
capture the drivers of persistent changes in price and cost competitiveness of 
each Member State relative to its major trading partners. The REER is 
frequently considered among early warning indicators. It assesses price and 
cost competitiveness developments and not some other aspects of 
competitiveness like product quality or overhead costs, so it is 
complemented by other scoreboard indicators such as export market shares. 
Symmetric indicative thresholds are used and they differ between the euro-
area (-/+5%) and non-euro-area Member States (-/+11%). 
 
Export market shares 
 5 years percentage change of export market shares measured in 
values, with an indicative threshold of -6% 
 This indicator aims at capturing structural losses in competitiveness. 
Changes in export market shares can be driven by the increase/decrease of a 
country's export volume (numerator effect) but also by the growth of total 
world exports in goods and services (denominator effect). So countries can 
lose market shares because their exports grow more slowly than total world 
exports. The percentage change over five years of exports for each country 
as share of the world exports allows for measuring long-term 
competitiveness development. The indicative threshold of the export market 
share indicator corresponds to cumulative losses of 6% over a period of five 
years.  
 
Nominal unit labour cost (ULC) 
 3 years percentage change in ULC, with indicative thresholds of +9% 
for euro area countries and +12% for non-euro area countries  
 The indicator of nominal ULC monitors developments in price and 
cost competitiveness across the EU Member States. A rise in an economy’s 
nominal ULC corresponds to a rise in labour costs that exceeds the increase 
in labour productivity. If other costs are not adjusted in compensation, 
economy's cost competitiveness can be threatened. The three-year percentage 
change is used in order to capture the medium term developments of labour 
costs. The indicative threshold for the euro area countries is 9%, for non-
euro-area countries 12%. Together with the REER indicator, the ULC 
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indicator allows a comprehensive assessment of the cost/price 
competitiveness developments in the Member States. 
 
House price index 
 year-on-year changes in house prices relative to a Eurostat 
consumption deflator, with an indicative threshold of 6% 
 Large movements in housing markets can be an important source of 
macroeconomic imbalances and have been associated with several economic 
crises. The consumption deflator is used in calculation to reflect the value of 
house prices relative to the whole consumption basket.  
 
Private sector debt  
 private sector debt (consolidated) as a percentage of GDP with an 
indicative threshold of 133% (previously 160%) 
 Excessively high private sector debt increases the vulnerability to 
economic shocks. The indicative threshold of private sector debt is 133% 
GDP; however, there is no firm evidence from the literature on an optimal 
level of debt in the economy. 
 
Private sector credit flow  
 private sector credit flow as a percentage of GDP with an indicative 
threshold of 14% (previously 15%) 
 Private sector credit flow includes loans and securities other than 
shares. This indicator is the flow counterpart of private sector debt (a stock 
indicator). Quickly expanding credit is considered as one of the best 
predictors of financial or banking crises. Credit growth is also a good early 
warning indicator for house price booms and there is a potentially important 
link between credit growth and external imbalances.  
 
General government sector debt  
 general government sector debt as a percentage of GDP with an 
indicative threshold of 60% 
 A high level of general government debt increases the vulnerability 
of a Member State, weakens its room of manoeuvre to deal with crisis 
situations and is even more worrying when it is accompanied by large private 
sector debt. The indicator for general government debt is therefore included 
in the scoreboard to provide a broader picture of Member States' 
indebtedness, not to monitor risks of unsustainable public finances, which 
are covered by the SGP. The Treaty reference value of 60% of GDP is used 
as the indicative threshold for this indicator, as a separate threshold under the 
MIP would be confusing. 
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Unemployment rate 
 3-year backward moving average of unemployment rate, with an 
indicative threshold of 10% 
 The indicator of unemployment rate helps to better understand the 
potential severity of macroeconomic imbalances in terms of their likely 
persistence and the capacity of the economy to adjust. The indicator is 
defined as the 3-year backward average of the unemployment rate which was 
preferred to yearly figures, strongly influenced by short term volatility.  
 
Financial sector liabilities  
 year-on-year percentage change in total financial sector liabilities, 
with an indicative threshold of 16.5% 
 This indicator has become the eleventh indicator of the scoreboard 
(European Commission, 2012a) and was included in the scoreboard for the 
second AMR published in November 2012. It aims at better capturing the 
interlinkages between the real economy and the financial sector. Experience 
has shown that a fast expansion of the financial sector has often preceded 
financial crises. While the European Systemic Risk board (ESRB) monitors 
financial stability risks, the MIP looks at the financial sector from the point 
of view of macroeconomic imbalances.  
 The appropriateness of the scoreboard of indicators is regularly 
reviewed by the Commission from the view of the composition of indicators, 
the methodology used and the indicative thresholds established. In line with 
the MIP legislation, it is possible to add new or better-quality indicators to 
the scoreboard or replace some of the existing indicators. Besides the 
scoreboard results, the economic reading takes into account other relevant 
information and the broad economic context using complementary additional 
indicators which are also reported in the AMRs. This includes growth and 
employment developments, nominal and real convergence, as well as 
productivity developments.  
 Four AMRs have been already published and few modifications have 
been made. However, according to some authors, the MIP still suffers from 
severe shortcomings, e.g. with respect to the surveillance of competitiveness 
divergences and current account imbalances (Hallwirth, 2014) or due to its 
predominant single-country focus (Moschella, 2014; Ederer, 2015), and the 
limited integration of macroeconomic and financial analyses, which may 
lead to missing important systemic developments. In addition, the MIP 
regulations remain relatively vague on the criteria to establish “excessive 
imbalances” in a country (Kamps et al, 2013). 
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Development of the MIP indicators in selected EMU Member States 
before the recent crisis 
 We have analysed available data for the indicators of the MIP 
scoreboard in the period 2004 – 2007, i. e. prior to the outbreak of the global 
financial and economic crisis, in order to test whether the indicators and 
thresholds established would have allowed to identify macroeconomic 
imbalances early on and thus anticipated the crisis. We have chosen twelve 
EU Member States using euro as the official currency in the period analysed, 
namely Austria, Belgium, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Ireland, Italy, 
Luxemburg, Netherlands, Portugal and Spain.36 Hence, table 1 with indicator 
values for 2004 – 2007 contains only indicative thresholds for the euro area 
Member States for REER and ULC. Figures falling outside the thresholds 
established by the Commission in the AMR are highlighted in grey. 
 As seen in the table, the countries analysed can be divided into two 
groups with different characteristics. For the first group, the group of 
countries more or less belonging to the so called core of the EMU (or the 
North eurozone): Germany, Austria, Luxembourg, Netherlands, Finland, 
Belgium, France, current account surpluses (in several countries large)37, 
positive or only moderately negative NIIPs, modestly growing ULC, real 
exchange rate depreciation (apart from Belgium and Luxembourg), relatively 
lower indebtedness of the private sector in most countries and government 
debts below or slightly over the threshold (apart from Belgium), slower 
growing private credit flows and only moderately expanding financial 
sectors were typical in the period analysed.  
 On the other hand, the second group consisting of euro area periphery 
economies (South eurozone, apart from Ireland; sometimes called GIIPS: 
Greece, Ireland, Italy, Portugal, Spain), was characterised by relatively large 
current account deficits (apart from Italy), highly negative NIIPs (apart from 
Ireland and again Italy), a significant rise in nominal ULC, real exchange 
rate appreciation, quickly expanding private sector credit flows (apart from 
Italy), high overall indebtedness as well as a fast expansion of the financial 
sector (apart from Italy and Portugal) and increase of real estate prices (in 
particular in Spain, Ireland).38 
 
 
 
 
                                                          
36 A similar analysis has been conducted by Essl and Stiglbauer (2012) who used a smaller 
sample of countries, ten indicators and data for a shorter period. 
37 Gross (2012), in his analysis, left France out of as its current account behaviour exhibits a 
mixed feature, surplus until 2006 and deficit afterwards. 
38 According to Gross (2012), Italy is in a position similar to the one of France (i.e. not 
sharing clearly the features of either group). 
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T a b l e   1 
The indicators of the scoreboard in selected euro area Member States in the pre-crisis 
period (2004 – 2007; figures highlighted are the ones falling outside the thresholds 
established by the AMR) 
  
External Imbalances and Competitiveness Internal Imbalances 
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Thresholds 
 
-
4%/6% -35% ±5% -6% 9% 6% 133% 14% 60% 10% 16.5% 
Austria 2004 2,2 -17,3 4,5 5,2 1,9 -3,6e 124,5 4,1 64,8 4,5 11,0 
 
2005 2,0 -21,7 2,6 12,6 2,8 2,5e 124,0 6,8 68,3 4,8 22,4 
 
2006 2,4 -12,9 -1,7 1,3 2,6 2,0e 126,1 5,4 67,0 5,0 9,2 
 
2007 2,8 -9,8 -1,8 0,7 3,8 2,0e 127,2 8,1 64,8 4,8 11,0 
Belgium 2004 3,7 28,4 6,2 na 2,5 6,3 120,4 9,4 96,6 8,0 14,2 
 
2005 2,9 33,5 5,0 -7,4 1,7 9,7 121,9 6,3 94,8 8,4 15,7 
 
2006 2,3 29,4 0,5 -15,8 2,8 6,5 120,3 6,5 90,8 8,4 10,8 
 
2007 1,9 28,9 0,2 -10,3 5,8 4,7 133,9 18,0 86,9 8,1 15,5 
Finland 2004 6,2 -9,3 6,7 -2,2 1,6 7,7 106,0 6,5 42,7 9,0 13,4 
 
2005 4,5 -14,0 1,6 -6,3 2,8 7,1 114,7 12,7 40,0 8,7 13,9 
 
2006 4,2 -12,4 -5,5 -8,0 3,7 5,6 117,9 8,8 38,2 8,3 12,6 
 
2007 3,6 -25,9 -4,9 -5,9 3,8 3,9 122,3 13,0 34,0 7,7 10,2 
France 2004 0,8 -4,7 9,3 -13,4 5,8 12,7 104,8e 5,7e 65,5 8,7i 9,8 
 
2005 0,4 1,1 6,0 -7,4 5,1 13,2 109,2e 8,2e 67,0 8,8 15,1 
 
2006 0,2 1,1 -0,5 -14,9 4,8 9,8 112,6e 9,2e 64,2 8,9 15,1 
 
2007 -0,1 -1,5 -1,5 -18,1 5,7 3,6 115,6e 11,2e 64,2 8,6 12,6 
Germany 2004 2,6 10,7 7,4 5,0 1,3 -2,6 119,0p -1,7p 64,6 9,7 3,9p 
 
2005 3,5 21,0 4,6 9,5 0,0 -0,3 117,1p 0,3p 66,8 10,5 6,3p 
 
2006 5,0 27,9 -1,5 2,0 -2,9 -1,5 114,1p 1,3p 66,3 10,7 4,8p 
 
2007 5,8 26,5 -1,5 0,6 -2,9 -3,7 111,0p 2,0p 63,5 10,1 8,1p 
Luxemburg 2004 9,5 116,1 6,5 14,6 7,3 11,7 na na 6,5 3,8 14,8 
 
2005 10,2 133,5 6,6 15,5 5,6 8,1 na na 6,3 4,5 31,4 
 
2006 11,3 140,5 3,3 18,4 6,9 8,3 na na 7,0 4,7 16,1 
 
2007 10,7 105,0 2,4 23,0 8,4 4,8 na na 7,2 4,5 12,2 
Netherlands 2004 5,3 3,7 7,9 -2,4 7,4 2,2 214,1 5,1 50,0 4,1 5,9 
 
2005 6,9 -2,6 3,2 1,7 1,9 3,3 217,7 12,3 49,4 4,9 16,4 
 
2006 8,1 3,2 -2,1 -4,4 -0,5 1,8 217,7 13,6 44,9 4,9 12,4 
 
2007 7,8 -6,0 -2,1 -2,7 1,5 2,5 216,8 13,1 42,7 4,4 15,0 
             Greece 2004 -6,3 -67,0 10,4 21,6 12,8 -0,5e 74,4 11,4 98,9 10,2 8,9 
 
2005 -6,7 -77,3 6,4 6,3 12,1 7,8e 86,2 14,3 101,2 10,1 16,8 
 
2006 -8,3 -85,4 0,3 -4,8 9,6 9,6e 93,0 16,3 103,4 9,9 14,1 
 
2007 -11,2 -96,1 -0,4 3,8 10,6 2,5e 101,9 16,2 103,1 9,1 22,0 
Ireland 2004 -0,6 -17,9 18,4 12,6 10,7 9,3 150,1 23,7 28,3 4,5 20,0 
 
2005 -2,1 -24,5 12,1 5,9 14,8 6,5 171,2 33,8 26,2 4,5 35,1 
 
2006 -4,2 -5,3 2,7 -12,5 12,8 11,9 191,7 41,0 23,8 4,5 21,3 
 
2007 -6,7 -19,5 3,1 -15,4 14,3 4,3 198,1 24,9 24,0 4,5 9,6 
Italy 2004 -0,6 -16,7 11,0 -6,8 11,0 3,6 89,7 7,5 100,0 8,3 7,2 
 
2005 -0,8 -17,7 6,8 -5,0 9,2 5,4 95,9 9,6 101,9 8,0 12,1 
 
2006 -1,0 -22,8 -0,5 -12,6 7,0 3,1 102,2 10,4 102,5 7,5 10,5 
 
2007 -1,3 -24,1 -1,2 -10,0 6,5 2,6 109,6 11,9 99,7 6,9 0,6 
Portugal 2004 -8,0 -66,8 9,0 -4,1 7,1 -1,6 165,8 13,0 62,0 6,8e 6,4 
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2005 -8,5 -69,9 5,3 -3,5 7,4 -1,4 171,4 12,0 67,4 7,7e 10,7 
 
2006 -9,6 -79,3 0,7 -4,4 4,3 -1,5 176,5 12,6 69,2 8,2e 13,8 
 
2007 -10,1 -88,8 0,6 -4,5 5,1 -1,9 185,0 18,2 68,4 8,7e 10,2 
Spain 2004 -4,0 -51,9 10,8 2,5 9,4 13,0e 137,8 19,5 45,3 11,3 16,3 
 
2005 -5,4 -55,6 7,8 5,5 9,6 8,0e 154,9 26,9 42,3 10,6 25,3 
 
2006 -7,2 -65,8 3,1 -3,2 10,0 11,2e 177,8 35,2 38,9 9,6 20,0 
 
2007 -8,8 -78,1 2,7 -3,2 11,3 6,3 191,9 26,0 35,5 8,6 16,8 
Flags: e – estimated, na – not available, p – provisional. 
Source: European Commission (2014). 
 
 Current account balances across the euro area countries have 
developed very differently over the first ten years of the euro. The Southern 
European economies built up large current account deficits vis-à-vis the 
Northern euro area countries and experienced a massive loss of 
competitiveness. Data for current account balance in 2004 – 2007 in Table 1 
provide evidence of this development. Current account imbalances derived 
both from structural competitiveness factors (different countries’ 
restructuring and outsourcing of production) and from the asymmetric 
macroeconomic effects of the EMU on creditor and debtor countries (sharing 
a common currency) (Guerrieri, 2012). By removing exchange rate risk, the 
introduction of the euro encouraged massive capital flows to, and large 
current account deficits in the South eurozone. Meanwhile, there have been 
large current account surpluses in Northern countries. To some extent, these 
deficits may reflect the higher investment needs in the lower-income 
countries in Southern Europe as they lag behind in terms of economic 
development. But sustaining such imbalances has serious consequences for 
the economy and the euro. The excessive demand boom in the peripheral 
countries was promoted by private and public consumption and residential 
investment spending.39 This led to persistent inflation, strong increase of 
ULC, loss of competitiveness, and asset price inflation – notably in the 
housing market, so gaps in competitive positions widened in the two groups 
of countries. These developments were not sustainable.  
 While little attention was paid to these imbalances for many years, 
the recent crisis has shed more light on them and revealed many weaknesses 
in the euro zone architecture. Since the start of the crisis and in particular 
after 2009, the large capital flows from the Northern countries have suddenly 
stopped, creating severe adjustment pressures. However, to correct existing 
imbalances in a sustainable way, both deficit (debtor) and surplus (creditor) 
countries have to pursue appropriate policies. According to De Grauwe 
(2012) as well as Ederer (2015), adjustments in surplus and deficit countries 
                                                          
39 In Spain and Ireland, foreign capital was used to sustain massive construction booms. In 
Greece, Portugal and to a lesser extent Italy, foreign capital was used to finance 
consumption (Gross, 2012). 
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need to be symmetric and coordinated to prevent further destabilising 
developments in the EMU. 
 Running continued current-account deficits also adds to the national 
debts, whether it is in the form of government debt or private debt. There 
were countries in both analysed groups highly exceeding the reference value 
of 60% GDP for government debt (Greece, Italy, and Belgium). In contrast, 
Luxembourg (first group) and Ireland (second group) recorded very low 
general government debt ratio in the analysed period. However, while in 
Luxembourg government indebtedness has stayed at a low level during the 
crisis, in Ireland the development has rapidly changed since the outbreak of 
the crisis, reaching more than 120% GDP in 2012, mainly due to rescuing its 
insolvent banking system by the government. A significant rise in 
government debt ratio has been recorded also in Spain since 2008. This 
supports the statement that high public debts can be more the effect than the 
cause of the EMU crisis.  
 Private sector debt as percentage of GDP exceeded the indicative 
threshold in three economies from the second group (Ireland, Portugal, and 
Spain) and in two countries from the first group (Belgium and 
Netherlands)40. What can be considered as crucial is the fact that the overall 
indebtedness of both private and government sector was higher than 200% of 
GDP in all countries belonging to the second group in 2007. This, combined 
with other macroeconomic imbalances, contributed to negative development 
in the next years.  
 As regards other two indicators, export market shares and 
unemployment rates, the picture is mixed. From the view of changes in 
export market shares, France seems to be even more problematic than Italy 
or Ireland and in the analysed period unemployment rates only slightly 
exceeded the threshold in Germany, Greece and Spain. 
 As development after 2007 shows, it was economies from the second 
group that have experienced the most serious economic difficulties - 
recession, increase in overall indebtedness and rapid deterioration of labour 
market situation. Finally, financial assistance from the EU41 and 
International Monetary Fund (IMF) has been provided to Greece (2010, 
2012), Ireland (2010), and Portugal (2011) as well as to the Spanish banking 
sector (2012). In return they committed to implement austerity measures 
aimed at reducing their budget deficits and agreed to implement structural 
reforms in order to improve their competitiveness. 
                                                          
40 And probably also in Luxembourg, where data are not available for this indicator until 
2008. 
41 The European Financial Stability Facility (EFSF), the European Financial Stabilisation 
Mechanism (EFSM), the European Stability Mechanism (ESM), bilateral loans from euro 
area Member States.  
European Scientific Journal August 2015 /SPECIAL/ edition ISSN: 1857 – 7881 (Print) e - ISSN 1857- 7431 
174 
Conclusion 
 As the development of the scoreboard indicators in twelve euro area 
Member States in 2004 – 2007 shows, a combination of several 
macroeconomic imbalances was present in this period. So the MIP 
scoreboard would have anticipated a high risk of the emergence of the crisis. 
The macroeconomic imbalances proved to be unsustainable, and in 
worsening global economic environment, they led to serious crisis which 
required providing financial assistance to economies concerned.  
 Large macroeconomic imbalances may also undermine the stability 
and functioning of the whole EMU and affect confidence in the euro. Thus, 
for the solution of the crisis and successful functioning of the euro area in the 
long term, it is of utmost importance to eliminate or reduce the existing 
imbalances within the monetary union, using the appropriate governance and 
policy mix. The new procedure for preventing and correcting 
macroeconomic imbalances in the euro area could facilitate such 
adjustments, prevent macroeconomic imbalances from re-emerging and 
contribute to sustainability of the EMU, provided that the new governance 
framework is used effectively and takes into account the real causes of the 
eurozone crisis, i.e. understands the imbalances as a symmetric phenomenon 
requiring a coordinated cross-country approach. 
 
Note 
 This research was financed under the Horizon 2020 program, project 
No. 649261 – FIRSTRUN. 
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